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Abstract  
Issue ownership theory expects political parties to focus their campaigns on ‘owned’ 
issues for which they have a reputation of competence and a history of attention, and 
to avoid issues that play to the advantage of their opponents. However, recent 
empirical studies show that parties often campaign on the same issues. The literature 
has suggested several factors to account for this behavior, but has mostly neglected 
that issue emphasis strategies can vary across campaign communication channels and 
parties. Based on a quantitative content analysis of the manifestos and press releases 
of all seven parties competing in the 2009 regional elections in Flanders (Belgium), 
we make two contributions. First, we show that while there is some consistency in 
parties’ issue priorities, they do not necessarily set the same issue priorities in their 
different campaign communication channels. Second, it appears that parties follow 
different strategies depending on their standing in the polls, and, to a lesser degree, 
according to their position in government or in opposition.  
Keywords 
Saliency theory, issue ownership, political parties, communication channels, election 
campaigns, Belgium  
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Introduction 
Agenda-setting scholars know that “agendas foreshadow outcomes” (Riker, 1993, p. 
1). The relationship between the shapes of agendas and their outcomes is well 
established in the policy literature (e.g., Baumgartner and Jones, 1993), but is also 
recognized in electoral politics, as well as communications, research. For instance, a 
burgeoning body of literature shows how extensive media coverage of specific policy 
issues ‘primes’ voters to give more weight to these issues when evaluating 
presidential candidates (e.g., Iyengar and Kinder, 1987). Scholars have also shown 
how parties use priming as a campaign strategy. They try to set the electoral agenda 
by focusing public attention on certain policy issues, which voters then use as 
evaluation criteria to choose among parties (e.g., Jacobs and Shapiro, 1994).  
One prominent perspective in the literature is that parties hardly ever prime 
the same policy issues during election campaigns. The saliency theory of party 
competition (e.g., Budge, 1982; Budge and Farlie, 1983a; Robertson, 1976) posits that 
parties do not primarily compete over different policy positions on given issues, as 
argued by direct confrontation theories that are often inspired by Downs (1957), but 
instead selectively emphasize certain favorable issues and downplay other 
unfavorable issues. Similarly, the theory of issue ownership (e.g., Petrocik, 1996) 
asserts that parties are, in the minds of voters, associated with specific issues, and 
considered most able to deal with them, i.e., they are perceived as ‘owning’ these 
issues. To gain an electoral advantage, the parties are incentivized to focus their 
campaigns on the party-owned issues that highlight their strengths and simultaneously 
point out their opponents’ weaknesses.  
Nonetheless, the empirical evidence for this theory is mixed at best. Whereas 
some studies confirm that parties primarily focus on party-owned issues during 
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election campaigns (e.g., Budge and Farlie, 1983; Green and Hobolt, 2008; Petrocik, 
1996; Spiliotes and Vavreck, 2002), many other studies’ findings contradict the 
expectations of the issue ownership theory and show that parties often focus on the 
same set of issues during election campaigns (Banda, 2013; Brouard et al., 2012; 
Damore, 2004, 2005; Dolezal et al., 2014; Kaplan et al., 2006; Sides, 2006; Sigelman 
and Buell, 2004). Recent research has attempted to identify what motivates parties to 
engage in such “issue convergence” (e.g., Sigelman and Buell, 2004)1: External 
factors, such as the “state of the world” (Budge and Farlie, 1983) or the public mood 
(Stimson et al., 1995), agenda-related factors, such as the “party-system agenda” 
(Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2015), organizational factors, such as party 
resources and organizational goals (Wagner and Meyer, 2014), and the campaign 
environment (Damore, 2004, 2005; Spoon et al., 2014) have all been shown to matter. 
In this article, we contribute to this recent literature by focusing on an additional 
factor that has not yet attracted much attention: differences in campaign 
communication channels. 
Previous studies have assessed parties’ issue choices in single campaign 
communication channels. Whereas US studies have generally relied on TV ads, 
European studies have usually resorted to party manifestos or, more recently, to press 
releases. Both strands assume that these specific data sources provide representative 
views of parties’ issue priorities. However, there are reasons to question this 
assumption; parties could very well emphasize different issues in different 
communication channels (see Elmelund-Præstekær, 2011). Moreover, political ads, 
press releases, and party manifestos differ in their length, timing, and frequency of 
publication.  
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In this paper, we test the thesis that these differences in form between 
communication channels also lead to differences in content. First, by analyzing how, 
and the extent to which, parties’ issue strategies differ across two communication 
channels (manifestos and press releases), we assess whether the role of issue 
ownership also differs according to the campaign channel. Second, we argue that 
different parties emphasize owned issues to varying degrees. Both parties in 
opposition and parties that are losing in the polls have stronger incentives to 
emphasize party-owned issues than winning parties and parties in government. 
We test our arguments through a quantitative content analysis of party 
manifestos and press releases published by the seven main parties competing in the 
2009 regional elections in Flanders, Belgium. The Belgian case offers a good 
background to assess the dynamics of issue competition in a multiparty context. The 
Belgian (Flemish) party system is highly fragmented, with seven major parties 
competing in the country’s regional elections. These parties are situated along the 
entire range of the left-right political spectrum and offer a mix between traditional 
mass parties (Christian-Democrats, Socialists, and Liberals) and more recent parties 
that ground their success in the politicization of selected newer issues (Greens, 
Extreme Right, Nationalists, and Neo-Liberals). 
The empirical analyses support our basic thesis. First, although there is a clear 
association between the issue priorities in party manifestos and in press releases, our 
findings show that parties do not implement the same strategy in both campaign 
channels. In manifestos, parties allocate more attention to issues that are also 
important to other parties, but they tend to place a greater emphasis on their own 
issues in press releases. Second, parties indeed follow different strategies depending 
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on their standing in the polls and according to their status in government or in 
opposition.  
Different communication channels, different issue strategies 
Agenda-setting scholars are well aware of the fact that “there is no such thing as the 
political agenda” (Walgrave and van Aelst, 2006, p. 94). This general statement is 
also true for parties’ campaign agendas. In election campaigns, parties communicate 
their issue positions and priorities in many different ways: through party manifestos, 
election ads, press releases, flyers, statements in the mass media, at party conventions 
and public meetings, and so on. Despite parties’ broad use of different communication 
channels, scholars have traditionally relied on single campaign channels to assess 
parties’ issue emphasis strategies (for exceptions, see Norris et al. 1999; Green and 
Hobolt, 2008). In the United States, studies are generally based on political ads (e.g., 
Damore, 2004, 2005; Kaplan et al., 2006; Sides, 2006; Sigelman and Buell, 2004; 
Spiliotes and Vavreck, 2002), whereas European studies typically rely on electoral 
manifestos (e.g., Brouard et al., 2012; Dolezal et al., 2014; Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen, 2015; Spoon et al., 2014), or on press releases (Green and Hobolt, 2008; 
Hopmann et al., 2012; Meyer and Wagner, 2016). Whichever campaign channel is 
investigated, the underlying assumption is that each specific data source provides a 
representative view of the parties’ issue priorities and that parties emphasize the same 
issues to a similar extent in all their campaign materials. Indeed, it can be argued that 
campaigns are most effective when parties stay “on message” (Norris et al., 1999, p. 
62)—that is, they maintain consistency and stick to their preferred issues over the 
course of the campaign in all their communication channels. 
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While we agree that parties are generally interested in producing a coherent 
message across their campaign channels, we argue that such consistency cannot be 
taken for granted. Parties’ issue priorities in different campaign channels are probably 
correlated, but there are reasons to believe that they are not identical and that parties 
do, for different reasons, set different issue priorities in their various campaign 
materials. In fact, election ads, press releases, and party manifestos differ in their 
length, timing and frequency of publication. Party manifestos are lengthy and 
elaborate documents that are written and released only once, before the actual start of 
the campaign. By contrast, election ads and press releases are much shorter, usually 
focused on a single issue, and are continually produced and published during the 
weeks before Election Day. We expect that these differences in form lead to 
differences in issue content. The few available studies that analyze different campaign 
channels provide some evidence to support this argument (Elmelund-Præstekær, 
2011; Norris et al., 1999; but see Green and Hobolt, 2008), but the important question 
is to what extent do they differ, and how? How consistent are parties’ issue choices 
across communication channels? Do owned issues play a greater role in some 
communication channels, and, if so, in which ones?  
Some of the literature suggests that owned issues occupy more space in 
manifestos than in press releases or election ads. Norris et al. (1999, p. 62), for 
instance, argue that manifestos reflect a party’s “ideal strategic” agenda, which 
defines a party’s key issues and is dominated by issues that are most favorable for the 
party and simultaneously the most damaging for rival parties. This is typically the 
case for party-owned issues. Moreover, it is Norris and colleagues’ view that political 
ads, press releases, and flyers, by contrast, form a party’s “tactical” agenda, which is 
in part inspired by, and based on, the ideal agenda, but is at the same time used to 
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tactically respond to short-term developments during the campaign (such as 
unexpected events, media coverage, or the strategic moves of other parties) and to 
take up issues that have become more salient. This is possible because such “tactical” 
agendas are continually produced and released throughout the campaign, whereas 
manifestos are published only once and cannot be used to strategically adjust to the 
campaign environment. For most parties, responding to short-term campaign 
developments in tactical agendas thus implies that they can less focus on party-owned 
issues than in manifestos. 
Although plausible, this expectation is not the only one possible. The opposite 
expectation—that parties focus more strongly on party-owned issues in political ads 
and press releases than they do in manifestos—seems equally convincing. The reason 
is that manifestos, press releases, and ads not only differ in their timing and frequency 
of publication, but also in their length. Although the length of manifestos can vary 
considerably between parties, manifestos are usually comprehensive documents 
intended to give a broad overview of the policies and priorities that a party plans to 
pursue while in government. As ideal programs for government, they need to address 
a wide range of issues, including those issues that a party has not necessarily shown 
an interest in, or established a reputation of competence. As a candidate for 
government, a party has to show its broad interest and convey its views on many 
issues, even those that it cares less about. Otherwise, it risks being seen as a ‘one-trick 
pony’ instead of as a feasible candidate for government participation. Thus, there is 
some pressure to publish a ‘complete’ party manifesto.  
Although manifestos probably address unowned issues in less detail than 
owned ones, parties have more freedom to completely ignore unowned issues in 
political ads or press releases. These documents are much shorter and usually deal 
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with only one or two issues. There is no external pressure on parties to address all the 
issues in these documents. Although parties may use them to take up new or 
unpleasant issues in response to recent campaign developments (as commonly 
expected in the literature), they are also free to selectively draw on their ‘full’ party 
program to highlight traditional, party-owned issues, and to set aside other issues. 
Thus, parties have the right to remain silent about a range of issues in their press 
releases and ads, but they do not have the same right in their manifestos.  
Based on this discussion and the competing theoretical considerations, we 
formulate the following research questions: 
RQ1: To what extent do parties’ issue priorities in manifestos influence their issue 
priorities in press releases?  
RQ2: Do parties focus more strongly on party-owned issues in press releases or in 
manifestos? 
Different parties, different issue strategies 
We argue that issue strategies also across parties, depending on their standing in 
opinion polls and their status as the party in government or in opposition. Generally 
speaking, parties with a bad standing in the polls that are likely to lose seats may be 
more willing to adjust their strategies in the final weeks before Election Day than 
parties that are predicted to win. Winning parties have reason to believe that they 
touched a chord with voters and thus have incentives to “stay put,” and their issue 
emphasis is expected to be consistent (Spoon et al., 2014, p. 367). Hence, our first 
expectation: 
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H1: For winning parties, issue priorities in manifestos more strongly predict issue 
priorities in press releases than they do for losing parties. 
As Green (2011) argues, when parties are popular, they have a broad set of available 
issues to discuss, but when parties are doing badly in opinion polls, they only have 
their owned issues to fall back on because these are the only areas in which they are 
seen as competent. According to Green, the issue ownership strategy of losing parties 
is driven by vote-seeking objectives, whereas others argue that it is particularly aimed 
at a party’s core base and represents an attempt to secure at least the support of 
traditional party voters who expect—sometimes even demand—that the party 
emphasizes its owned issues (Budge, 2015; Stubager and Slothuus, 2013). Whatever 
their motives, focusing on their primary issues may help losing parties to steer public 
attention towards their traditional strengths. Given that parties tend to have stronger 
arguments on owned issues (Riker, 1993), they may stand a better chance of using 
them to turn the tide. This is not to say that winning parties have no interest in 
campaigning on party-owned issues; it just means that losing parties have even 
stronger incentives to do so. This leads us to our second expectation:  
H2: Parties that are losing in the polls focus more strongly on party-owned issues 
in their press releases than winning parties. 
Another potentially relevant aspect is a party’s position in government or in 
opposition. Although not focused on election campaigns, recent agenda-setting 
literature has shown that parties in government are less free than parties in opposition 
to choose the topics they decide to address (e.g., Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 
2010; Walgrave and van Aelst, 2006; Vliegenthart and Walgrave, 2011). Parties in 
government are in charge of running the country; they cannot afford to ignore 
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upcoming issues and problems, no matter how unpleasant they may be.2 This implies 
that they are more likely to deviate from their ‘ideal’ issue agenda and to show less 
continuity in their issue emphasis across communication channels than parties in 
opposition. A similar argument has been made for election campaigns: government 
parties have incentives to sell, explain, and defend their policy record on a broad 
range of issues, especially when the economy performs poorly, whereas opposition 
parties can selectively focus on favorable issues (Greene, 2015). Hence, our final two 
expectations: 
H3:  For parties in government, issue priorities in manifestos less strongly predict 
issue priorities in press releases than they do for parties in opposition. 
H4: Parties in opposition focus more strongly on party-owned issues in their press 
releases than parties in government. 
Belgian parties in the context of the 2009 regional elections in Flanders 
In this study, we rely on data from the 2009 Flemish regional election campaign in 
Belgium. Flanders is the largest region in Belgium, which is itself a small, federalized 
democracy in Western Europe (Deschouwer, 2009). Due to strong centrifugal 
tendencies, the regions have gained many competences in the past decades and have 
become influential policy levels in their own right. Regional elections in Belgium can 
be considered to be of almost equal importance to their national (federal) equivalents; 
by no means do they demonstrate a second-order character (Van Aelst and Lefevere, 
2012). The same parties compete on both levels, media attention during the 
campaigns is equally high, and Belgian politicians frequently switch from the regional 
to the federal level and vice versa, and most run in each election. Party leaders sit as 
often in the regional parliament as they do in the national parliament. Moreover, 
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through a long process of devolution, the regional competences and budgetary powers 
of the regions match those of the national state. In sum, regional elections in Belgium 
are like national elections—and the 2009 regional election campaign in particular 
received ample attention from the media, the public, and, most importantly, the 
parties. In fact, regional campaign spending in 2009 totaled over 15 million euro, 
compared to 13 million for the 2007 national elections (Deschouwer et al., 2010; 
Maddens, 2010).  
The Flemish party system is highly fragmented. In the 2009 elections, seven 
main parties were competing for votes: three traditional parties—the Christian-
Democrats (CD&V), Socialists (Sp.a), and Liberals (Open VLD)—and four newer 
parties—the Greens (Groen), Neoliberals (LDD), Extreme Rightists (VB), and 
Flemish Nationalists (N-VA). The incumbent Flemish government initially consisted 
of five parties when it was formed in 2004: Christian-Democrats, who then still 
formed an alliance with the Flemish Nationalists, the Liberals, and the Socialists with 
their small alliance partner Spirit (which ran separately in 2009 but failed to pass the 
electoral threshold). However, in the period between the 2004 and 2009 regional 
elections, Belgian politics experienced tumult. After the 2007 national elections, the 
strains relating to a difficult government formation caused a split in the Christian 
Democratic/Flemish Nationalist cartel and the Flemish Nationalists left the regional 
government. Furthermore, a new neoliberal party (LDD) emerged and obtained seats 
in the national parliament.3 Thus, the Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Socialists 
entered the 2009 campaign as incumbents, and were faced with four opposition 
parties (Deschouwer et al, 2010). Of these four parties, two had prior government 
experience: the Flemish Nationalists were initially part of the incumbent regional 
government, and the Greens were in government between 1999 and 2004 at the 
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regional and national levels. In contrast, the extreme right VB, as well as the 
neoliberal LDD, had never been in government. 
The 2009 election took place in the aftermath of the outbreak of the banking 
crisis, which was then still developing into a full-blown economic crisis. 
Unexpectedly, the economy was the most emphasized issue in the media coverage of 
the campaign, and it was also the most salient issue amongst voters. A related salient 
issue was unemployment, but the issue of state reform also received quite a lot of 
media attention at the time (Lefevere, 2011). 
The Flemish Nationalists were the big winners of the 2009 regional elections. 
Running for the first time with their own party list, they gained 13% of the votes at 
the expense of their former alliance partner, the Christian-Democrats, but mostly to 
the disadvantage of the Extreme Right. The Greens, Socialists and Liberals also lost 
some voters, but to a much lesser extent. After the elections, a new regional 
government formed between the Christian-Democrats, the Socialists, and the Flemish 
Nationalists. 
Data and methods 
To test whether parties pursue different issue strategies in different campaign 
communication channels, we draw on party manifestos and press releases. Both were 
coded according to the coding scheme of the Belgian Agendas Project 
(http://www.comparativeagendas.net/belgium). It comprises 26 major topic categories 
(e.g., agriculture, defense, etc.) and over 200 subcategories (e.g., agricultural trade, 
agricultural marketing and promotion, etc.). In this study, we only focused on the 
major issue topics, grouped five topics with very few cases as ‘other’ issues, and 
dropped the subcategory dealing with ‘political activities and elections.’ The reason 
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for this exclusion is that this is the only topic that does not deal with policy, but 
politics, and thus cannot be owned by any party. 
Press releases are continually published throughout the entire campaign 
period. We informally contacted all Flemish parties to inquire about the role of press 
releases in their overall campaign strategies. All parties indicated that their key 
campaign events were almost always accompanied by a press release. However, press 
releases also partially tap the parliamentary agenda, because the parliamentary groups 
often have the liberty of issuing their own press releases. This is not the case for the 
Extreme Right, whose central party press service checks all press releases. Overall, 
press releases capture the staged party events during the campaign. We collected and 
coded all press releases that were published by the seven Flemish parties from 
February until Election Day (June 5). One coder with prior coding experience with 
the classification scheme of the Belgian Agendas Project coded all the press releases 
(N=984). After a training session, the coder coded a first batch of press releases, 
which were then checked by an expert coder. Subsequently, a second training session 
was scheduled to improve the coding accuracy by providing additional coding 
guidelines. To ascertain inter-coder reliability, a random sample of 5% of the press 
releases (N=44) was double coded by the expert coder. The Krippendorff alpha for 
issues was 0.74, which is acceptable, especially given the complex codebook. In this 
article, we focus on all the press releases that were published in the ten weeks before 
the election (N=397). 
In party manifestos, every semi-sentence was coded using the same issue 
classification scheme. The length of the party manifestos differed substantially 
between parties, from a minimum of 334 semi-sentences for the Green manifesto to a 
maximum of 4,700 semi-sentences for the Socialist manifesto. Student coders 
15 	
assigned a unique issue code to each semi-sentence. Given the complex procedures, it 
is difficult to calculate inter-coder reliability with the traditional Krippendorff’s alpha 
measure. Since coders first have to split the sentences when necessary, certain coders 
ended up with more units than others. Therefore, the correspondence of the coding 
distributions at the lowest coding level was compared. The average Pearson 
correlation is 0.77 and all correlations range between the exceptionally low 0.57 and 
0.91. Given the detail and the large number of possible codes, this is a satisfying 
result.  
To test our hypotheses, we use the following explanatory factors. We use 
secondary literature to determine our central independent variable: Flemish parties’ 
issue ownership reputations in the minds of voters. On the one hand, we refer to a 
study by Walgrave et al. (2012) that measures parties’ (associative) issue ownership 
for ten issues (environment, taxes, crime, social security, unemployment, economic 
crisis, immigration, state reform, culture, and mobility) based on a representative 
panel survey conducted in the context of the 2009 regional elections (Partirep09). We 
use the issue ownership perceptions of Flemish respondents on the aggregate level 
reported in the study (Walgrave et al. 2012, p. 775). On the other hand, we also 
employ an earlier study by Walgrave and de Swert (2007, pp. 44-46) that reports 
(competence) issue ownership for additional issues. We apply the following criteria to 
decide whether an issue is owned, has shared ownership, or is unowned: if a party is 
designated as the issue owner by more than 20% of voters, and it has a 10% lead on 
the second party, it is assigned as the single owner of that issue (coded as ‘1’). If a 
party is designated as the issue owner by more than 20% of voters, but its lead is less 
than 10%, it is considered to be a partial owner (coded as ‘0.5’ for each partial 
owner). Finally, for all other party and issue combinations, the variable is coded as 0.4 
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In the event that the two studies reported different ownership of the same issue, we 
gave precedence to the study by Walgrave et al. (2012) that presents survey evidence 
on voters’ issue ownership perceptions in the 2009 regional elections.5 Table 1 lists 
the issue owner(s) of all coded issues.6  
-- TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE -- 
The variable poll measures the difference in percentages (i.e., loss or gain) 
between the predicted vote share of a party according to the polls in the months prior 
to the start of the campaign, and the vote share a party obtained in the previous 2007 
election.7 To obtain a more robust estimation of the parties’ standings in the polls, we 
took several major polls published between September 2008 and the end of March 
2009 by the newspapers La Libre Belgique (LLB) and Het Laatste Nieuws (HLN), as 
well as by the public broadcaster VRT, and calculated for each party the average 
predicted vote share (for a similar operationalization, see Walter et al., 2014).8 The 
reason for picking these polls is straightforward: the September LLB poll is the first 
major poll published after the split of the CD&V-N-VA cartel that allowed us to 
obtain separate scores for these parties, whereas the March LLB poll is the last one 
that was published before our period of analysis of the parties’ press releases. One 
party was clearly predicted to win in the polls: the Neoliberals (+8.8% when 
compared to the previous election). Three parties were on an upward trajectory in the 
months before the election (the Greens, the Flemish Nationalists, and the Christian 
Democrats), whereas three parties were predicted to lose (the Socialists, the Liberals, 
and the Extreme Right). 
Note that we do not have exact information for when exactly the parties 
drafted their manifestos for the 2009 elections. All that is known for certain is that 
manifestos are drafted sometime before the campaign starts. For Flemish parties, 
17 	
drafting a manifesto is typically a long and careful process; many groups within the 
party are engaged in it (scientific service, caucus, and special task forces, etc.) and 
most parties, at the end of this process, let their manifesto be solemnly approved by 
their members in a formal party congress just before the campaign starts. Only after 
this formal vote is the manifesto final. Yet, the actual writing of the manifesto takes 
place (many) months before this final approval is given. Additionally, the timing of 
party manifesto drafting and approval differs across parties. The election under 
consideration here took place on 5 June, 2009. We include press releases from the 
beginning of April onwards (10 weeks before Election Day) so we can be sure that 
manifestos precede press releases in time and that, if there is any causal relationship 
between them, it goes from manifestos to releases. However, our poll measure per 
party is based on an average of polls over seven months preceding the campaign 
(September 2008–March 2009). This period definitely overlaps with party manifesto 
drafting. Perhaps not only the press releases, but also manifesto drafting, are affected 
by a party’s standing in the polls? We cannot definitively rule this out. But, we hold it 
is much more likely that press releases are affected by poll results than party 
manifestos. Party manifestos are much more constrained documents, and a lot of 
groups are involved in their drafting. It is a sticky process that takes time and in which 
the strategic short-term considerations play a smaller role when compared to issuing 
press releases. That is why we did not formulate a hypothesis about how manifestos 
react to polls, and take manifestos as a point of departure from which parties can 
deviate through their press releases in relation to their standings in the polls. 
We capture a party’s status in regional government or in opposition with a 
dummy variable (Government), which takes a value of 1 for the three incumbent 
parties (the Christian Democrats, Liberals, and Socialists), and a value of 0 for the 
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four opposition parties (the Greens, Flemish Nationalists, Neo-Liberals, and Extreme 
Right). Note that there is no problematic colinearity between our independent 
variables. 
Finally, we control for the extent to which other parties emphasize a given 
issue in their manifestos and press releases, respectively (Attnother parties). This variable 
reflects the average emphasis placed on the issue by all other parties, excluding the 
party itself, and indicates whether parties react to the agenda set by their competitors 
or by common external factors (e.g., Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2010, 2015; 
Hopmann et al., 2012; Wagner and Meyer, 2014). 
We use a stacked dataset to test our hypotheses. In this dataset, the number of 
cases is equal to the number of party/issue combinations (7 parties x 22 issues = 154 
cases). We have two dependent variables for this analysis: the percentage of attention 
a party dedicated to each issue in its party manifesto (M=4.55, SD=4.66) and in its 
press releases (M=4.54, SD=5.31). Given the small number of cases, we cannot 
include a random intercept for issues or party dummies, but run linear regression 
models with clustered standard errors on the party level to predict issue attention in 
manifestos and press releases. Note that in some models, issue attention in manifestos 
is also used as an independent variable to predict issue attention in press releases. In 
this way, we can assess the degree of consistency in the parties’ issue choices across 
communication channels and provide an answer to our first research question (RQ1). 
Issue attention strategies in the 2009 regional elections in Belgium 
We first explore the differences in parties’ issue attention across communication 
channels. Table 2 provides answers to our two research questions. 
-- TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
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As shown in the first model in Table 2, parties’ issue attention in manifestos 
has a significant and positive effect on their issue attention in press releases. Hence, 
there is a good deal of consistency in parties’ issue attention across communication 
channels: issues that received higher (lower) attention in preceding manifestos also 
receive higher (lower) attention in subsequent press releases. This result is rather 
unsurprising: campaigns are said to be more effective when parties “stay on message” 
(Norris et al., 1999). The more interesting question was rather to what extent do 
parties’ issue priorities in manifestos published before the campaign predict their 
issue emphases in press releases published during the campaign? With only one 
explanatory factor, the explained variance of the model is substantial (Adj. R² = .24) 
but it still leaves a lot of variance unexplained. There is a clear link between 
manifesto and press release content, but parties also adjust their issue priorities during 
the campaign across communication channels. This answers RQ1.  
The question is how are the strategies different? Do they more heavily 
emphasize party-owned issues in manifestos or in press releases (RQ2)? To answer 
our second research question, we present two new models that predict issue attention 
in press releases and manifestos (Models 2 and 3 in Table 2) by parties’ issue 
ownership while controlling for the mean attention that other parties devote to a given 
issue. Issue ownership has a significant and positive effect on parties’ issue attention 
in press releases, but has no effect on their issue attention in manifestos. The 
difference between the issue ownership coefficients between Models 2 and 3 is 
significant (p < 0.109). As such, we find evidence that parties do tend to emphasize 
owned issues significantly more in their press releases than they do in their 
manifestos. The models also show that parties do not compete in complete isolation 
from one another: The mean attention that parties devote to a particular issue 
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influences another party’s issue choices. This effect is significant and positive in both 
models, but it tends to be slightly stronger in the manifesto model (although the 
coefficients are just below statistical significance, p = 0.11). When other parties’ 
attention to a given issue increases by 1%, then a party’s own attention to the same 
issue increases by 0.9% in manifestos, and by 0.6% in press releases. If we add a 
party’s prior attention to the issue in its own manifesto as a control variable in Model 
2 (results not shown in the table), then the effect of other parties’ issue attention loses 
some statistical power (+0.34%, p < 0.1) and is much weaker than in the manifesto 
model. At the same time, the effect of issue ownership is no longer significant (β = 
5.62, p = 0.128).  
In sum, our analyses show considerable consistency in parties’ issue priorities 
across communication channels, but at the same time challenge the idea—that is 
common in the literature—that any given communication channel can provide a 
representative picture of a party’s issue strategies in an election campaign. Parties’ 
issue emphases are not identical in different campaign materials; they are influenced 
somewhat more by other parties’ issue attention in manifestos than in press releases. 
Our results challenge the prevailing view in the literature that manifestos are ‘ideal 
agendas’ that give priority to party-owned issues. As an answer to our second 
research question, we can thus state that, if anything, issue ownership has more 
impact on parties’ issue selection in press releases than in manifestos.  
Yet, we argued that the degree of issue consistency across communication 
channels, as well as the extent to which parties focus on owned issues, depends on a 
party’s standing in the polls and their status in government or in opposition (H1to 
H4). To assess these hypotheses, we estimate new press release models to test the 
impact of parties’ standings in the polls (Table 3) and their status in government or in 
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opposition (Table 4). Because we have a limited number of cases and several 
interaction terms to estimate, we proceed in different steps and present several 
models. However, we only comment upon the last (full) model in both tables. In these 
models, the interaction terms are central to assess our expectations because they allow 
us to examine if issue attention in manifestos has a different effect on issue attention 
in press releases for winning and losing parties (H1) and for parties in government 
and in opposition (H3), and if issue ownership plays a different role in determining 
issue attention in press releases of losing and winning parties (H2) and of parties in 
government and in opposition (H4). 
Table 3 shows the findings for the impact of parties’ standings in the polls. 
-- TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE -- 
In Model 4, the first interaction term (Poll*Attnmanif) is significant and 
positive. This suggests that the impact of a party’s issue attention in manifestos on its 
issue attention in press releases is larger for parties that are winning in the polls, as 
predicted by H1. The second interaction term (Poll*IO) is also significant and has the 
expected negative sign. This suggests that winning parties tend to focus less on party-
owned issues in their press releases than losing parties, which is in line with H2. To 
get a clearer view of these effects, Figures 1 and 2 depict the marginal effects of the 
independent variables (issue attention in manifestos and issue ownership, 
respectively) depending on a party’s standing in the polls. 
-- FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE -- 
Figure 1 shows that the impact of a party’s issue attention in manifestos on its 
issue attention in press releases is not significant across the entire range of poll 
predictions: for parties that are expected to lose votes, there is no significant 
relationship. There is, however, a weak but positive and significant marginal effect for 
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winning parties: the more votes a party is expected to gain, the more the content of its 
press releases is consistent with the issue emphases in its manifesto that was 
published before the start of the campaign.  
Conversely, Figure 2 reveals that issue ownership only has a significant effect 
on parties’ issue attention in press releases for parties that are losing in the polls. The 
more a party is expected to lose voters, the more likely it is to focus on owned issues 
in its press releases published during the campaign. In contrast, for parties expected to 
increase their electoral share, the fact of owning an issue or not has no significant 
effect on the issue content of their press releases. Thus, we can confirm our first two 
hypotheses: a party’s standing in the polls has an impact on its campaign strategy, 
although the evidence in support of H1 is relatively weak. 
We may now turn to the impact of parties’ position in government or in 
opposition (Table 4). 
-- TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE -- 
The first interaction term (Government*Attnmanif) in Model 4 is significant and 
negative, as expected. To get a better understanding of this effect, Figure 3 illustrates 
the marginal effect of issue attention in manifestos, depending on a party’s status in 
government or opposition. 
-- FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE -- 
Figure 3 shows that the marginal effect of issue attention in manifestos on 
issue attention in press releases is not statistically significant for government parties, 
but it is for opposition parties. Thus, opposition parties are more consistent in their 
issue choices than parties in government: their issue choices in manifestos positively 
influence the issue priorities in their press releases. The second interaction term 
(Government*IO) is also negative, as expected, but the effect does not reach statistical 
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significance. For this reason, we do not graphically show it. While the literature 
suggests that during non-election periods, issue ownership plays a stronger role for 
opposition parties than it does for government parties, it does not prove to be relevant 
during election campaigns and thus we reject H4. 
Conclusion and discussion 
This article contributes to the existing literature on parties’ issue emphasis strategies 
by showing that single parties can set different issue priorities in their various 
campaign communication channels. On the one hand, we found a clear connection 
between party manifestos and press releases: when issues get attention in the 
manifestos, which are designed well before the start of the actual campaign, chances 
increase that they will also be picked up in press releases, which are continually 
released during the weeks leading up to Election Day. Hence, manifestos inspire 
parties’ issue strategies in press releases, resulting in relatively consistent party 
messages throughout the campaign. On the other hand, however, manifestos do not 
fully determine the content of press releases: parties readjust their priorities during the 
campaign. Our findings suggest that party manifestos may be “ideal strategic” 
agendas (Norris et al., 1999, p. 62) in the sense that they provide a starting point for 
the subsequent campaign, but not in the sense that they are primarily used to highlight 
traditional, party-owned issues. Rather, manifestos seem to be encompassing 
documents containing policy proposals on the most diverse set of issues, many of 
which are not owned by the party. Moreover, manifestos tend to give precedence to 
those issues that also receive considerable attention from other parties. In contrast, we 
found press releases to be slightly less influenced by other parties’ issues and more 
focused on party-owned issues. From the perspective of citizens who are looking for 
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information, manifestos offer more potential when it comes to directly comparing 
parties’ positions and ideas on similar issues, whereas press releases provide them 
with a better indicator of parties’ priorities and issues that can be expected to be 
tackled once the party has gained office. 
Yet, not all parties pursue the same strategies. First, parties in opposition show 
more consistency in issue attention across communication channels. Second, parties 
expecting to lose the election tend to distance themselves, issue-wise, from their 
manifesto and use press releases to focus on party-owned issues—presumably in an 
effort to turn the tide in their favor.  
These findings underline the complexity of issue strategies, which not only 
vary across time, but also across communication channels and parties. Thus, it may 
not be possible to generally confirm or reject the basic expectations of the issue 
ownership theory as the effect of issue ownership on parties’ issue emphasis is 
contingent. Rather, the more important question seems to be for which parties, when, 
and in which channels, do party-owned issues play a greater role? In other words, 
researchers should account for parties’ variable use of different campaign materials. 
Different campaign communication channels are not interchangeable, and combining 
them in the analysis may help researchers to refine their ideas about the conditions 
under which parties pursue issue ownership strategies, or rather engage in direct 
confrontation with other parties.  
A question remains regarding how previous research investigating parties’ 
motivations to address similar issues can be integrated into our framework. It would 
be interesting to know whether external factors, such as sudden and unexpected 
events (e.g., financial crises), or agenda-related factors, such as intense issue 
discussions in parliament or the media, affect parties’ issue strategies in manifestos 
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and press releases to the same extent or if the incentive to address these issues (and 
therefore to converge issue-wise with other parties) is stronger in one of the two 
communication channels. We encourage future researchers to take up this question. 
A final question that remains to be answered deals with the generalizability of 
our findings beyond the 2009 regional election campaign in Flanders, Belgium. The 
2009 Flemish campaign took place in a tumultuous time: the Nationalists had just 
ended their alliance with the Christian Democrats, a new party, the Neoliberals, was 
running for office for the first time, and the financial and economic crisis may have 
pushed parties to emphasize issues such as the economy, social welfare, or labor, to 
an unusual extent. Still, we expect that varying issue strategies across communication 
channels and parties may also be found in other countries and at other levels of 
governance. The specifics may differ, of course, but we predict that parties make 
similar strategic calculations in other systems as well. Thus, we encourage researchers 
to consider different combinations of campaign communication channels to shed 
more light on the complexity of parties’ issue strategies in election campaigns.																																								 																					
1 We use the term “convergence” instead of other, often interchangeable terms, such as “issue 
trespassing” (e.g., Sides, 2006), “issue engagement” (Meyer and Wagner, 2016), or “dialogue” (e.g., 
Simon, 2002). 
2 A similar argument has been advanced to hypothesize about the expected differences in the issue 
attention profiles of mainstream and niche parties (Green-Pedersen and Mortensen, 2015) and of 
smaller and large parties, respectively (Spoon et al., 2014). 
3 Lijst Dedecker (LDD) is a splinter party formed around Jean-Marie Dedecker. Dedecker was part of 
the Liberal party but left after an internal dispute to form his own party. 
4 We focus on the associative dimension of issue ownership because Partirep09 includes no indicator of 
competence issue ownership. Although the two issue ownership dimensions affect the vote differently 
(Walgrave et al., 2012; Lachat, 2014), the distinction is less relevant in the study of party behavior: on 
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the aggregate level, the same party is usually considered an associative and competence issue owner, 
although the competence measure produces generally weaker issue ownership (e.g., Lachat, 2014). 
5 On the aggregate level, issue ownership is a stable feature of parties (but it is not so at the individual 
level). That is why it is valid to merge older (Walgrave and de Swert, 2007) with more recent 
(Walgrave et al., 2012) issue ownership data, supposing that, at the aggregate level, it has not changed 
much. One concern could be that our older and newer issue ownership data measure different 
dimensions of issue ownership: associative and competence issue ownership, respectively. Still, since 
these two dimensions are strongly correlated at the aggregate level—the same party is usually 
considered an associative and competence issue owner (e.g., Lachat, 2014 : 734)—we decided to 
combine the data. Another concern is that some of our issue ownership measures were collected in 
2009, that is, in the same year as the elections for which issue ownership was supposed to predict the 
parties’ behaviors. This potentially raises an endogeneity problem, but since issue ownership 
perceptions are fairly stable at the aggregate level and unlikely to be influenced by short-term factors, 
and since the bulk of the surveys reported in Walgrave et al. (2012) were carried out before the 
publication of party press releases and manifestos, it is not very likely that the causal arrow can be 
reversed. 
6 Our coding explicitly acknowledges that ownership of some issues is contested between two or more 
parties (Geys, 2012; Walgrave and de Swert, 2007), especially in multiparty systems. Given that the 
literature operationalizes issue ownership most often in a dichotomous way, there is no generally 
accepted standard telling us how large the dominance of one party on an issue must be in order 
toconsider it the sole owner of the issue. We decided on a 10% lead, which is substantial, especially in 
fragmented party systems like Belgium’s. Note that for energy, we assigned ownership to the Greens; 
while neither of the two published studies on which we base our operationalization measure this issue 
directly, in the case of Belgium, at least energy and environment are highly related. The discussions 
concerning energy policy predominantly focus on the phasing-out of nuclear power plants, which is 
closely related to the environment. We used the survey measure on the issue of “economic crisis” 
(Walgrave et al., 2012, p. 775) to assign ownership of the “banking” issue. This seems justified given 
that the economic crisis was primarily concerned with crises in the banking and financial sector. For 
several other issues, we lack information about parties’ issue ownership; this is very often the case for 
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relatively minor issues that are not salient for any party or the public (such as public lands, or science 
and technology). 
7 To measure gains and losses in the polls, different points of reference can be chosen, namely, 
standing in previous polls, vote share in previous elections, or the standing of a competing party 
(Kleinnijenhuis and Takens, 2011). Although we are interested in the dynamics of the campaign, 
asking how parties refocus issue attention in press releases as compared to manifestos, we decided to 
take the previous election as our point of reference instead of a poll shortly after the manifestos were 
published. The main reason for this is that the results of the previous election that are at stake in the 
current election are an important benchmark for campaign managers; a party may slightly lose or gain 
ground between two polls, but what really matters is whether the party can increase (or at least 
maintain) its results from the previous election. For two parties, CD&V and N-VA, no separate scores 
were available for 2007 since they formed a cartel at that time (they only split a few months prior to the 
2009 elections). Thus, we opted to compare N-VA’s score (6.75) to the voting threshold of 5%, thus 
assigning a score of +1.75. We put CD&V at a slight gain (+1.00), as although they were polled as the 
largest party (21.2), they were below their 2007 cartel score. 
8 Polls published by La Libre Belgique on 27 September, 2008, 23 December, 2008, and 31 March, 
2009, poll published by Het Laatste Nieuws on 17 January, 2009, and polls published by VRT on 16 
October, 2008 and on 1 March, 2009.  
9 We used seemingly unrelated regression (suest) in Stata to test whether the coefficients in models 2 
and 3 were significantly different, or not. 
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Table 1:  Issue owner(s) of issues  
Issue Walgrave and de Swert (2007: 
44-46) 
Walgrave et al. (2012: 775) Coded issue ownership 
(assigned value) 
Macroeconomics Economic policy : Liberals (32%), 
Christian-Democrats (25%) 
Economic Crisis : Liberals (30%), 
Chistian-Democrats (29%) 
Christian Democrats (0.5), 
Liberals (0.5) 
Rights & liberties Euthanasia : no issue ownership N/A None (0) 
Health Health care : Socialists (34%), 
Christian-Democrats (26%) 
N/A Socialists (0.5), Christian 
Democrats (0.5) 
Agriculture Food safety : no issue ownership N/A None (0) 
Labour Employment : Socialists (34%) Unemployment : Socialists (41%) Socialists (1) 
Education Christian-Democrats (35%) N/A Christian Democrats (1) 
Environment Greens (60%) Greens (87%) Greens (1) 
Energy N/A N/A Greens (1) 
Immigration Extreme Right (46%) Extreme Right (50%) Extreme Right (1) 
Transportation Mobility : Socialists (39%) Mobility : Socialists (27%, less 
than 10% lead) 
Socialists (0.5) 
Justice Crime : Extreme Right (30%) Crime : Extreme Right (35%) Extreme Right (1) 
Social welfare Social security : no ownership Socialists (50%) Socialists (1) 
Housing N/A N/A None (0) 
Banking & commerce N/A N/A Liberals (0.5), Christian 
Democrats (0.5) 
Defence N/A N/A None (0) 
Science & technology N/A N/A None (0) 
Foreign trade N/A N/A None (0) 
Foreign policy International security : Socialists 
(20%, less than 10% lead) 
N/A Socialists (0.5) 
Government operation  
(incl. state reform) 
Flemish independence: Christian-
Democrats (21%), Extreme Right 
(28%), Nationalists (22%) 
State reform: Nationalists (33%), 
Christian-Democrats (27%) 
Nationalists (0.5), Christian 
Democrats (0.5) 
Public lands N/A N/A None (0) 
Culture N/A Socialists (24%, less than 10% 
lead) 
Socialists (0.5) 
Other N/A N/A None (0) 
Note: Numbers between brackets indicate the percentage of voters identifying the party as issue owner (first two columns) and our coding of issue ownership, respectively 
(third column). For the Walgrave and de Swert study, percentages relate to their measure of ‘explicit’ issue ownership whenever possible, otherwise to the lower percentage 
relating to ‘implicit’ issue ownership. 
Table 2 Explaining issue attention in party manifestos and press releases, 
OLS regressions with clustered standard errors for parties. 
 Model 1 
(Press releases) 
Model 2 
(Press releases) 
Model 3 
(Party manifestos) 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Attn manif 0.55** 0.14     
IO   6.43+ 2.75 0.40 1.22 
Attn other parties   0.60* 0.21 0.90*** 0.04 
Intercept 2.03* .66 1.31 0.93 0.44* 0.16 
Adj. R2 0.24  0.23  0.54  
N 154  154  154  
Note: (+ = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 The impact of standing in polls on issue attention in press releases, 
OLS regressions with clustered standard errors for parties. 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Attnmanif 0.41+ 0.18 0.42+ 0.18 0.31+ 0.13 0.32+ 0.14 
IO 5.70 3.23 3.28+ 1.39 5.87+ 2.99 3.44* 1.28 
Attnother parties 0.34+ 0.14 0.37+ 0.16 0.37+ 0.16 0.40 + 0.18 
Poll 0.04 0.03 0.09+ 0.04 -0.27*** 0.03 -0.22** 0.04 
Poll* Attnmanif     0.07*** 0.01 0.07*** 0.01 
Poll*IO   -2.50* 0.70   -2.52** 0.59 
Intercept 0.66 0.84 0.45 0.87 0.97+ 0.49 0.75 0.52 
R2 0.34 0.39 0.41 0.46 
N 154 154 154 154 
Note: (+ = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4  The impact of parties’ status in government or in opposition on issue 
attention in press releases, OLS regressions with clustered standard 
errors for parties. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. Coeff. S.E. 
Attnmanif 0.41+ 0.18 0.60* 0.16 0.40+ 0.18 0.59* 0.17 
IO 5.74 3.24 6.35+ 3.24 8.78 5.48 8.45 5.82 
Attnother parties 0.34+ 0.14 0.37* 0.11 0.38* 0.15 0.39* 0.11 
Government -0.39 0.31 2.26* 0.71 0.10 0.48 2.44** 0.54 
Government* 
Attnmanif 
  -0.59** 0.14   -0.56* 0.18 
Government*IO     -5.82 6.13 -4.09 6.64 
Intercept 0.85 0.78 -0.19 0.75 0.54 0.74 -0.34 0.65 
R2 0.34 0.39 0.35 0.41 
N 154 154 154 154 
Note: (+ = p < .10, * = p < .05, ** = p < .01) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 Marginal effect of issue attention in manifestos on issue attention 
in press releases, depending on a party’s standing in opinion polls 
 
Note: Estimates based on Model 4 in Table 3. Dotted lines denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Marginal effect of issue ownership on issue attention in press 
releases, depending on a party’s standing in opinion polls..	 
 Note: Estimates based on Model 4 in Table 3. Dotted lines denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Marginal effect of issue attention in manifestos on issue attention 
in press releases, depending on a party’s status in government or in 
opposition 
 Note: Estimates based on Model 6 in Table 3. Lines denote 95% confidence intervals. 
 
 
 	
